A Certificateless-based One-Round Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol to Prevent Impersonation Attacks

• Huimin Ren,
• Suhyun Kim,
• Daehee Seo,
• Imyeong Lee,

Vol. 16, No. 5, May 31, 2022
10.3837/tiis.2022.05.015, Download Paper (Free):

• certificateless
• Authenticated group key agreement
• One-Round
• pairing-free
• ECC
• Impersonation Attacks

Abstract

With the development of multiuser online meetings, more group-oriented technologies and applications for instance collaborative work are becoming increasingly important. Authenticated Group Key Agreement (AGKA) schemes provide a shared group key for users with after their identities are confirmed to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of group communications. On the basis of the Public Key Cryptography (PKC) system used, AGKA can be classified as Public Key Infrastructure-based, Identity-based, and Certificateless. Because the latter type can solve the certificate management overhead and the key escrow problems of the first two types, Certificateless-AGKA (CL-AGKA) protocols have become a popular area of research. However, most CL-AGKA protocols are vulnerable to Public Key Replacement Attacks (PKRA) due to the lack of public key authentication. In the present work, we present a CL-AGKA scheme that can resist PKRA in order to solve impersonation attacks caused by those attacks. Beyond security, improving scheme efficiency is another direction for AGKA research. To reduce the communication and computation cost, we present a scheme with only one round of information interaction and construct a CL-AGKA scheme replacing the bilinear pairing with elliptic curve cryptography. Therefore, our scheme has good applicability to communication environments with limited bandwidth and computing capabilities.

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