Research on the Security Level of μ2 against Impossible Differential cryptanalysis

• Kai Zhang,
• Xuejia Lai,
• Jie Guan,
• Bin Hu,

Vol. 16, No. 3, March 31, 2022
10.3837/tiis.2022.03.012, Download Paper (Free):

• cryptanalysis
• Lightweight Block cipher
• μ2 Block Cipher
• Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis

Abstract

In the year 2020, a new lightweight block cipher μ2 is proposed. It has both good software and hardware performance, and it is especially suitable for constrained resource environment. However, the security evaluation on μ2 against impossible differential cryptanalysis seems missing from the specification. To fill this gap, an impossible differential cryptanalysis on μ2 is proposed. In this paper, firstly, some cryptographic properties on μ2 are proposed. Then several longest 7-round impossible differential distinguishers are constructed. Finally, an impossible differential cryptanalysis on μ2 reduced to 10 rounds is proposed based on the constructed distinguishers. The time complexity for the attack is about 269.63 10-round μ2 encryptions, the data complexity is O(248), and the memory complexity is 263.57 Bytes. The reported result indicates that μ2 reduced to 10 rounds can’t resist against impossible differential cryptanalysis.

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