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Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN
  • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems
    Monthly Online Journal (eISSN: 1976-7277)

Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN

Vol. 13, No. 8, August 30, 2019
10.3837/tiis.2019.08.013, Download Paper (Free):

Abstract

ACORN is an authenticated encryption algorithm proposed as a candidate in the currently ongoing CAESAR competition. ACORN has a good performance on security and efficiency which has been a third-round candidate. This paper mainly concentrates on the security of ACORN under the forgery attack and the non-repudiation of ACORN. Firstly, we analyze the differential properties of the feedback function in ACRON are analyzed. By taking advantage of these properties, the forgery attacks on round-reduced ACORN are proposed with a success probability higher than 2-128 when the number of finalization rounds is less than 87. Moreover, the non-repudiation of ACRON in the nonce-reuse setting is analyzed. The known collision can be used to deny the authenticated message with probability 2-120. This paper demonstrates that ACORN cannot generate the non-repudiation completely. We believe it is an undesirable property indeed.


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Cite this article

[IEEE Style]
T. Shi and J. Guan, "Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN," KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 4060-4075, 2019. DOI: 10.3837/tiis.2019.08.013.

[ACM Style]
Tairong Shi and Jie Guan. 2019. Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN. KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems, 13, 8, (2019), 4060-4075. DOI: 10.3837/tiis.2019.08.013.